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Abstract 
In the context of Decentralization in Indonesia, not much of assessment is given to the provincial level. 
Despite limited functions of provincial government, provincial governments have relatively more tax 
autonomy, thus making it possible to conduct and coordinate program priorities in the region through its 
government spending. However, democratic process starting in 2004 is believed could make government put 
less priority on longer-term objective such environmental protection, in this case referring to protection of 
forest. Based on provincial panel data from period of 2001-2010, we found higher spending on agriculture 
and forestry of lower level government may associate with a decrease in forest area after year 2004, especially 
on province level of government.  
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Province Government Spending and Forest Management in Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
Forest management and externality embedded in it is a challenge on which level of 
government would actually be effective to meet the needs on managing the forest. 
Characteristics and structure of government revenues and spending pattern may play role 
on level of government put concern on forest management especially on the one associated 
with minimizing deforestation or improvement of forest cover. 
 
Existing studies on forest management have not yet lead to the same conclusion on the 
effect of institution on forest conservation. Barbier (2004) uses perceived level of law and 
corruption and found that corruption tends to increase land use expansion, though there is 
no impact on the extent of political stability on agricultural land expansion. Meanwhile, 
based on data of forestry of Indonesia, Burgess et al. (2011) also found inconclusive finding 
on the impact of political indicators on forest management. 
 
Studies exploring effect of politic on deforestation in Indonesia mostly relies on local level 
(Burgess et al. 2011) assuming less function conducted at provincial level. However, on 
forest management, there are shifting from high local discretion to a more centralized 
system.  The forestry sector Law (Law 41 1999) emphasizes on the management of forestry 
at central level, which also includes on government revenues from forestry (i.e. licensing 
and royalties). 
 
Studies on forest protection mostly focus on factors affecting deforestation, and there are 
abundance of literature on exploring deforestation.2 In regard to study of forest protection 
in Indonesia, a focus mostly on local level and there is not yet a study that explored both 
policies of lower level governments related to forestry sector, a provincial as well as local 
government. In this case, lower level governments performance associated with forest 
management can be measured by the impact of its policy either on spending side or revenue 
side on forest protection referring to indicator of forest cover area. The context of three-
tier level of government may imply that even among lower level of governments, they may 
instead have a conflicting interest due to the built-in different incentive based on functional 
arrangement as regulated in the sector.3  
 
Administrative Decentralization introduced in 2001 has been characterized by functional 
arrangement that mostly fall as the responsibilities of local governments. In the case of 
forest management in Indonesia, there is a belief that decentralization has put management 
of forestry in chaos (Bar et al. 2006). A shift of system in 2001 is continued as in 2004 
there is also adoption of political decentralization in which head of provinces and local 
governments are determined from democratic election. 																																																								2	See	Sunderlin	and	Resosudarmo	(1996)	on	review	of	literature	on	Indonesia	deforestation.	3	PP	38	2007	and	Forestry	Law	41	1999	stated	that	each	level	of	government	can	manage	forest	area	based	on	scale	and	status	of	the	forest.	
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Forest management and Provincial Expenditures and Revenues 
Forests are a representation of common-pool resources between communities, and 
government between central and its lower level governments. Other than competition 
among agencies, a choice of exploiting forestry resource may be in competition with other 
type of natural resources such as mining or to some extent on plantation or agricultural 
sector.  
 
Forest sector is relatively highly regulated, and it is considered as more influenced by 
government decision at local level especially in the context of Indonesian decentralization 
(Burgess et al. 2011). There are various revenues from forestry exploitation that are 
managed by government either at central level through land rent, royalties, deforestation 
charges, or through licensing at local level. In addition to extracting revenues, forest sector 
is also dependent on government expenditure programs given authority in managing forests 
area is mostly conducted by central government. 
 
Existing recent studies on deforestation focused more on institution, implying that 
government policies may play a dominant role on forest management and thus affecting 
the output of forest conservation. Government preferences might be reflected through their 
planning priorities. Though one cannot know priorities and qualities of the planning, we 
might explore provinces planning priorities through their pattern of expenditures. Province 
revenues structure may also play role on attaining their planning priorities. 
 
The extent of forest management associate on which level below central government that 
influence output of forest management in terms of forest cover area. Government activities 
on forest management could be associated with the degree of priorities that government 
put to maintain resources or not to change it to make present tangible product from forest 
exploitation. In this case, forest exploitation could range from activities that are not 
affecting much of a change in forest ecosystem by not cutting trees or hunting animals in 
the forest area. 
 
Previous studies found that deforestation indirectly associate with government policies on 
pattern of their spending, in this case of whether provincial or local governments put 
priorities on capital spending.4 Putting priorities on forest management to some extent can 
be considered as investment. The benefit of the program would take time and might be 
perceived to accrue in the long-term, whereas costs on forest management would also 
associate with an alternative use of natural resources referring to a relatively high 
opportunity costs in maintaining the forests. There are two outcomes that might occurred 
on the extent to determine what might characterize provinces or local governments that 
would choose to maintain or conserve forests, thus limiting deforestation and engaging in 
afforestation effort. 																																																								4	As	cited	from	Ministry	of	Finance	report	(2012),	provincial	and	local	governments	in	Indonesia	have	not	yet	focused	on	expenditures	program	that	can	be	viewed	as	long-term	investment	that	could	be	said	as	cost-saving	by	engaging	in	infrastructure	programs.	
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For lower level governments, province or local government that have relatively high share 
of its expenditures on capital expenditures, may be viewed to have preference on public 
investment. It is likely that this type of government would choose to conserve forest when 
it needs to deal with the choices of whether to extract forest or a choice to convert forest in 
to other use mostly is for agricultural use. Meanwhile, based on type of revenues received 
by local governments, additional revenues that come from revenue sharing would lower 
pressure on forest exploitation, especially on regions that received revenue sharing on non-
related forest areas such as the case of revenue sharing from taxes or oil and gas revenue 
sharing (Wunder and Sunderlin 2004).  
 
Forest Protection: Estimation Model 
Given the characteristic of data and considering that this study will use forest cover data 
based on MODIS Satellite image as well as Landsat image as stated in Forestry Statistic, 
thus there is three model of estimation: 1) MODIS Forest cover area from 2001-2008, 2) 
Landsat Forest cover area from 2003-2010. 
 
In addition to data availability of a different data source of forest cover areas, separating 
regressions in to two period of estimations, to some extent would exclude the different 
context of institution especially in regard to policy of decentralization as there is an 
amended Law of No 22 and 25 1999) that has been changed into Law 32 and 33 2004 to 
accommodate a different approach of the functional arrangement among level of 
government, from previously residual approach to closed-list approach, and as stated 
previously, there is also a change of provincial and local government political system that 
moved to direct election of head of region from previously are appointed by legislatures. 
Therefore, we apply panel specification as follows: 
 !"# = %& + () + *+,"# + *-."# + /" + 0"#  (1) 
 !"# = %& + () + *+,"# + *+(),"# + *-."# + /" + 0"#  (2) 
 
where: ,"# = Realized province government (or local government consolidated) spending () = Time dummy variable (D=1 for year 2004 and forward) ."# = Other explanatory variables /"   = time invariant error 0"#  = time variant error 
 
The estimation assumes that there is a structural change that may influence preference of 
province and local government on forest protection. In this case, the channels on how a 
system of direct election is through government spending. Thus, other than dummy 
variable on period of direct election system, there is also a slope dummy on government 
expenditure variable as shown in estimation (2). In this case, estimation (1) is the baseline 
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estimation, in which only year period dummy, thus assuming there is no structural change 
on related government spending. 
 
Other explanatory variables consist of socio-economic indicators consisted of Gross 
Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), population, and share in agricultural sector. 
Sunderlin and Resosudarmo (1996) review studies on deforestation in Indonesia and 
concluded that there are relatively complex issues underlying what causes deforestation in 
Indonesia. A review of literatures by Sunderlin and Resosudarmo (1996) classifies 
determinants of deforestation in Indonesia, which in this case closely related to forest area, 
of land-use change from transmigration or plantation small-holders, agricultural crop 
industry, political institution, and economic development variables. They stated that other 
than the factor of land changes or agricultural expansion, institutions such as government 
policies and economic development may play role and needs to be more explored. 
  
Meanwhile, recent studies that are conducted after decentralization period generally 
focused more on political institution rather than land-use change or agricultural crop 
industry (Burgess et al. 2011, Galinato and Galinato 2013, Fredrikkson 2013). Political 
stability at national level tend to have positive effect on forest protection (Galinato and 
Galinato 2013). Burgess et al. (2011) found that new formation of local governments in 
Indonesia tend to have higher deforestation. As observations in this study is provincial 
level, we identify new local governments as the number formation of new local 
governments within province on a particular year.  
 
 
Data 
We use data of forest cover from MODIS satellite image that come from study of Burgess 
et al. (2011). In comparison, as one unresolved issue is on the data that are considered as 
forest area, we also use forest cover data come from Landsat Satellite image from Forestry 
Statistic that is issued by Ministry of Forestry. Based on Forestry Statistic, we use forest 
area coverage that consisted of primary and secondary dry land forest, primary and 
secondary swamp forest, primary and secondary mangrove forest, and plantation forest. 
However, the annual forest cover data of Landsat image is not available every year prior 
to 2004. Forest cover data stated in Forestry Statistic use Landsat Satellite image for the 
year 2001, 2003, and annually after 2004. Therefore, on estimation that based on MODIS 
forest cover data we use period of 2001-2008 while the period of estimation is between 
2003-2010 on Landsat forest cover area. Given this different dataset, we also treat province 
as province that has forest area if that province is included in both MODIS and Landsat 
data. Thus, total observations are 136 out of previously 330 observations. 
 
Data of government expenditures on forestry for the provincial and local government level 
are extracted from Ministry of Finance, Directorate of Fiscal Balance (DJPK – Direktorat 
Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan) website. Given classification of publicly available 
government expenditures based on sector, data of government expenditure on sector 
forestry are still aggregated with expenditures on agriculture and plantation. In terms of 
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local government expenditures, data are consolidated local government expenditures on 
forestry and agriculture within a province. Therefore, we also use variable the size of 
agricultural sector by using share of agriculture sector in GRDP as other explanatory 
variable.  
 
We use share of own source revenues to total realized budget as measure of province tax 
share. On average, province level of government has relatively more discretion and granted 
a relative buoyant type of taxes in comparison to local level of government. In this case, 
we also include revenue sharing received by local governments from central government, 
but we do not include local own revenues given a relatively insignificant amount of local 
own revenues in context of Indonesian local government budget structures. In this case, 
Tabel 1 shows statistics summary of the data.5 
 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows on how the estimation results on the effect of government spending is quite 
different between estimation specification (1) and (2).6 In estimation (1), the effect of both 
province government as well as local government forest and agriculture spending on forest 
cover area ranged from negative effect on definition and measurement of forest area based 
on MODIS data, and non-significant effect of both province and local government forest 
and agriculture spending on forest cover areas based on Landsat data. Meanwhile, the 
estimation results based on specification (2), indicate that forest and agriculture spending 
on provincial level seem to be ineffective. Prior to year 2004, the effect of province forestry 
and agriculture spending on forest cover areas is still positive, which means that higher 
spending in this sector associate with expansion in forest cover areas. However, after 2004, 
in both estimation that based on MODIS or Landsat forest cover areas, it shows that higher 
spending instead leads to lower forest cover areas. Higher government expenditures on 
forestry sector at province level that tends to reduce forest cover area in that province, may 
imply that the focus of that sector may be more on administrative and have not yet 
emphasized on enforcement of forest protection.  
 
The consistent pattern on the effect of provincial government forest and agriculture 
spending does not apply in regard to the effect of consolidated local government forestry 
and agricultural spending on forest cover areas. Between estimation based on MODIS and 
Landsat data, the results from specification (2) show a different effect of local government 
forest and agriculture spending on forest areas. Based on MODIS data, the effect of local 
government forest and agriculture spending is negative on forest cover areas, while the 
effect is not significant under the estimation that use Landsat data of forest cover areas. 
 
Identifying whether an increase on capital spending by either province or local government 
also associate with forest protection given that activities to preserve forest also reflect 
government preference to investment type of spending, estimation (3) in Table 2 shows no 																																																								5	See	Annex	6	See	Annex	
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evidence that higher capital spending of the province or local government is in line with 
forest management referring to an increase in forest area. This finding may imply that high 
capital spending might instead tends to be low in governance and thus reduce the 
effectiveness of the spending size (Kuncoro et al. 2013). 
 
Other than expenditures, government policy on revenues to some extent may influence 
decision of government to over-exploit or at least does not engage in forest protection 
effort. Some studies on case of Indonesia forest, has found that the over-exploitation of 
forest for lower level government revenues may likely resulted from unclear regulatory 
framework on sub-national and local taxes and charges (Smith et al. 2003). From Table 2, 
overall, it is shown that the revenue sharing received by provincial government tend to 
have positive effect on forest cover area. Provinces with higher revenue sharing also have 
larger forest cover areas. In this case, provincial government may put concern on sustaining 
forest sector resource when the stake is quite high in terms of the loss in revenue sharing if 
the forest resources are depleted quite fast. Meanwhile, on the case of local governments 
revenue sharing, higher revenue sharing seems to associate with depletion of forest cover 
area.  
 
In terms of size of economic activity, region economic development represented by Gross 
Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) seem to have forest cover area that is based on 
MODIS data. As shown in estimation results in Table 2, there is evidence of the existence 
of Kuznets condition on the relationship of economic development and forest natural 
resource protection (Choumert et al. 2013). Higher GRDP in province with high GRDP to 
start with would associate with an increase effort in forest protection. Meanwhile, for the 
provinces with relatively low GRDP, it is possible that an increase in GRDP might instead 
put pressures on forest protection.  
 
Conclusion 
Our results show that the efficacy of provincial and local governments forest management 
through its expenditures are still in question. Especially in the case of the province, there 
is a consistent negative effect from provincial forest expenditures on forest protection, after 
the year 2004, in contrast to the year prior 2004 that shows relatively an increase in 
provincial government expenditures would associate with higher forest protection. This 
finding raises question on whether putting coordination at the provincial level on region 
forest management might work.  
 
However, on revenues side, there is a positive effect of both revenue sharing and own 
revenues of provincial government. And this result is in reverse for the case of the local 
governments. The contrasting result between the effect of government spending of the 
provincial level and its revenues might suggest of the alternative function of provincial 
government on forest management.  
 
Forest management needs to be cooperated not only in context of program or spending 
related activities, but also on revenues policies. Finding what best conducted by each level 
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of government in terms of forest management would be a start in tailoring coordinated and 
consistent planning of forest protection across level of government. 
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ANNEX Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Max 
       
MODIS Forest cover areas (Ha) 136  1,451,722.00   1,624,675.00   201,239.00   7,038,848.00   7,038,848.00  
Landsat Forest cover areas (Ha) 136  4,921,477.00   7,903,371.00   207,277.50   40,800,000.00   40,800,000.00  
Local government forestry and agriculture 
expenditures (Million IDR) 136  499,591.80   1,182,136.00   -     6,614,012.00   6,614,012.00  
Province expenditures on forestry and 
agriculture (Million IDR) 136  44,943.20   76,245.10   -     723,264.00   723,264.00  
Local government per capita capital spending 
(IDR) 136  996,381.60   1,367,513.00   -     7,751,501.00   7,751,501.00  
Province per capita capital spending (IDR) 136  281,405.40   436,092.30   -     2,609,727.00   2,609,727.00  
Population (people) 132  4,350,131.00   2,952,768.00   1,500,000.00   16,000,000.00   16,000,000.00  
GRDP (Billion IDR) 136  34,008.13   28,075.48   5,070.10   106,172.00   106,172.00  
Per capita province own revenues (Thousand 
IDR) 132  105.54   88.80   -     654.16   654.16  
Local government per capita revenue sharing 
(IDR) 132  401,745.80   721,623.80   11,064.56   4,766,667.00   4,766,667.00  
Province per capita revenue sharing (IDR) 132  80,238.98   169,634.10   -     1,133,333.00   1,133,333.00  
% share of forest and agricultural spending 135  28.05   14.73   4.70   41.40   41.40  
Number of new local governments formed 136  0.78   1.64   -     9.00   9.00  
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ANNEX Table 2. Forest cover area (Ha) Estimation Results: Fixed Effect 
Variables (1) MODIS (1) LANDSAT (2) MODIS (2) LANDSAT (3) MODIS (3) LANDSAT 
Local Forest and Agriculture Expenditures -0.005** 0.07 0.27* -7.94   
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.14) (5.18)   
Local Forest and Agriculture Expenditures 
x Dummy 2004-End Period   -0.27** 8.02   
   (0.14) (5.18)   
Province Forest and Agriculture 
Expenditures -0.23*** -1.38 0.48* 28.95**   
 (0.08) (2.43) (0.29) (12.36)   
Province Forest and Agriculture 
Expenditures x Dummy 2004-End Period   -0.72*** -30.78**   
   (0.28) (12.33)   
Dummy 2004 – End Period -9393.35*** -985042.40*** 15205.4* -838325.8*** -657.22 -701789.60*** 
 (7082.83) (234497.20) (8273.3) (334336.5) (6451.29) (225277.40) 
Province Capital Expenditures     -0.07** -1.48*** 
     (0.01) (0.39) 
Local Capital Expenditures     -0.002 0.10 
     (0.00) (0.10) 
Population -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.005 0.0003 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) 
GRDP -3.04* 13.99  -4.74*** -17.39 -3.99** -16.34 
 (1.85) (59.37) (1.70) (59.12) (1.9) (63.1) 
GRDP Square 0.0000  0.0002  0.00003***  0.0005  0.00003** 0.0006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Per Capita Provincial Own Revenues  -84.18 5455.68** -48.67 5260.55** 30.54*** 7022.06 
 (75.73) (2252.90) (68.28) (2191.39) (68.56) (2137.51) 
Per Capita (Local) Revenue Sharing -0.02* -0.72** -0.02* -0.84** -0.011 -0.271 
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Variables (1) MODIS (1) LANDSAT (2) MODIS (2) LANDSAT (3) MODIS (3) LANDSAT 
 (0.01) (0.36) (0.01) (0.36) (0.01) (0.34) 
Per Capita (Province) Revenue Sharing 0.01 1.24 0.02 1.34 -0.01 -0.18 
 (0.03) (0.95) (0.03) (0.92) (0.03) (0.82) 
Share of GRDP Agriculture -1849.31 47159.64 366.23 17571.81 -455.20 62678.52 
 (1515.37) (51511.29) (1452.79) (54395.51) (1373.60) (48434.93) 
Number of New Local Governments 
Formation 2234.20 -423061.20*** 2120.35*** -441268.20*** 4066.61*** -360285.30*** 
 (1630.56) (58153.85) (1459.95) (57741.56) (1514.30) (55831.56) 
Constant 1581284.00 3333859.00 1530314.00 4638708.00 1545213.00 2943951.00 
 (72104.71) (2362406.00) (65668.59) (2466842.00) (70129.56) (2421274.00) 
       
Observations 115 100 115 100 115 100 
       
Notes: * significant in 10%, ** significant in 5%, *** significant in 1%; Period of Estimation Modis Forest Cover 2001-2008; Period of Estimation Landsat 
Forest Cover Area 2003-2010
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